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JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS. Edited by Harry C. Shriver.1 With an Introduc-
tion by Harlan Fiske Stone. New York: Central Book Company, 1936.
$3.00.
THIS IS A volume of Holmes miscellanies-the early reviews and comments
written between 1870 and 1873 by the young editor of the American Law
Review, plus some fugitive bits of the famous Holmes fleece that had not
yet been gathered from the famous Holmes hedges, plus a bundle of letters
written to his Chinese friend, John C. H. Wu. The letters are easily the
heart and prize of the collection-of them, more later. For the rest it is
good to have some of the early notes and comments, with their strong shop-
talk flavor and the insight they give us into the mind of a hard-working young
lawyer-good to have them if only to assure ourselves that there was a
period in his life when even Holmes could be a bit prosy and matter-of-
fact, and when not all the arrows that he shot were tipped with flame. It is
good also to have the few uncollected papers of his later years, as further
examples (if any were needed) of that exact proportioning of the statement
to the occasion which make Holmes's occasional utterances among the out-
standing ones in the language, comparable to Lincoln's, and possessing a
shade more grace than his if a shade less vigor. This book, by the very
fact that it is a somewhat dressed-up scrapbook, my now be added to the
1913 volume of Speeches and the 1920 volume of Collected Legal Papers to
complete the round-up of Holmes's scattered writings within book covers.
Add to these three volumes the treatise on The Common Law (which should
be required reading in every first-year law course in the country as a sup-
plement to the case books), the 1873 edition of Kent's Commentaries, and a
very few still uncollected signed articles, and you have the total harvest of
Holmes's writings outside of his judicial opinions and the main body of his
letters. When Holmes's literary executors have given us what letters and
personal documents they have been able to wrench loose from his tenacious
sense of privacy, we shall finally have the material on which to base an
estimate of a man who, by every standard, was one of the completest persons
to have emerged out of our culture.
The editing of the volume leaves something to be desired. We have now
reached the stage of Holmes-worship vhere we treasure every fragment of
his, not only for its essential quality, but also for its place in the complete
whole. This is the spirit in which Mr. Shriver has approached his task.
He has reprinted a whole set of unsigned book reviews and comments, orig-
inally discovered by Felix Frankfurter. It is no iconoclasm to say that while
it may be a good thing to gather up every scrap that a great man writes,
there is very little that is unusual or distinguished about these comments.
There are to be sure, as Justice Stone points out in his Introduction, some
1. Member, The District of Columbia Bar.
904
REVIEWS
startling intimations in some of the early papers-in an 1878 article an un-
derstanding of the legislative character of the judicial process, the extent to
which notions of public policy enter into the decision of cases, some shrewd
adumbrations (as early as 1871-2) of the value and also the limitations of
the case method in the study of law, some early statements of Holmes's
"prediction theory" of the law, a very striking paragraph on class legisla-
tion in connection with the 1872 strike of the London gas-stokers. It may
be that I am overcritical, but it seems to me that this does not justify the
ritual sacrifice of two-thirds of the 240 pages of text to the gods of com-
pleteness. Such material would be interesting-in fact, indispensable-to any-
one preparing a Holmes biography or a critical estimate of the development
of his thought. The ordinary student and reader, however, will find these
ideas best developed in his later speeches and opinions. Moreover he will be
annoyed, as I am certain Holmes himself would have been annoyed, by the
apparatus with which the primary material in the book is surrounded. The
degree of footnotage is enormous. I can understand a foot-note here and
there to give the context of a speech or review. I can even understand some
footnotes of the concordance type, giving parallel passages from Holmes's
other writings that bear on some remark or theory-although the editor here
does not seem to follow any logic for giving or withholding such parallel
passages. But the largest number of footnotes are of the supererogatory sort.
For example, here is a passage from one of Holmes's letters:
When Gilbert Murray purports to give me the spirit of Euripides,
I cannot help thinking that he is giving me a good deal of the spirit
of Swinburne also-in other words, putting into his translation a
feeling that I do not find in the Greek. That suspicion hangs over
every modern restatement of an old text.
That should be clear enough, but the editor is not content with it. He adds
a footnote:
Here Holmes refers to a very common failing of every epoch read-
ing in ancient texts their own ideas.
The larger number of his footnotes, however, do not so much underline
ideas as explain allusions to people. Whenever Holmes mentions, however
casually and in passing, Spencer or Maine or Dicey or Stammler or Ehrlich
or Austin or Savigny or Spinoza or Rousseau or Spengler, the editor is to
be found tagging along, seeking to explain to the reader who these men
are, and what they stand for in the history of thought. Holmes's whole
spirit would have been opposed to such pedantry. His was the kind of
thought that had above all else lightness and mobility, and did not wait
between one move and another to have all one's intellectual baggage and
impedimenta lugged up. I suppose that lawyers are ignorant, although I
see no reason for believing them more ignorant than other persons I have
known, including journalists and professors. But can they be so ignorant
as to attach no associations to the mention of Bertrand Russell, Spinoza,
Spengler, John B. Watson, Schopenhauer, Rousseau, and Santayana? And,
assuming one has no knowledge of Spinoza at all, to start with, by how
much wiser are you after reading:
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Spinoza's is the most consistent system of the epoch built inore
geonietrica, employing the synthetic Euclidean method. It is a phil-
osophy of identity which gives to causality a mathematico-logical
character: it is a monism which, for the purposes of a consistent
naturalism, eliminates the theological by means of a pantheism.
But I have said enough about the editing to give the reader a sense of its
character. I am sensible that it represents three years of Mr. Shriver's
devoted effort. But some of it might have been spared, and the reader given
a less irritating book, and one more suited to the whole spirit of Holmes's
mind and personality.
The letters to John C. H. Wu are especially revealing. They are the
heart of the book, and they are alone worth its price. They are the letters
of an old New England aristocrat, loaded with years and honors, to a young
Chinese student of law and philosophy. Wu seems to have sent Holmes
an article of his on Chinese law. He was twenty-two; Holmes was eighty.
Holmes answered gracefully but in a non-commital fashion. Gradually his
interest was stirred, and the letters ripened into a steady exchange of cor-
respondence over eleven years, including a period when Wu was in China
as professor and judge, and a period when he came to Cambridge on a
fellowship. The last letter was written when Holmes was ninety-one. To-
gether they offer the greatest amount of light that has thus far been shed
from any single source on Holmes's personality.
We see an old man, concerned about his age, expecting to die any year,
but gallant, generous, graceful-taking the time to dip into his rich experi-
ence and nourish an eager and hungry youth; we see a general in the
campaign of life painstakingly teaching a soldier the rules of warfare; we see
a man who has found success and a deep core of peace within himself gently
nurturing the troubled spirit of a young man just starting out; we see a
teacher writing to a student with infinite frankness and infinite tact. Holmes
is at his best in these letters. He chats about his reading; striking off amaz-
ingly keen critical comments in passing. Thus about Whitman: "I don't
care very much for his posing as a message-bearer and his ,Messiah Jesus
attitude, but I think that he is the most important poet America has pro-
duced." About Hegel: "He could not persuade me that a syllogism could
wag its tail . . he could not persuade me that his King of Prussia was
God." About Spengler's Decline of the West: "A stimulating humbug of
a book." About John Morley: "I used to think that in his world Harriet
Martineau was the Virgin and John Stuart Mill the prophet." About Ber-
trand Russell: "He argues in detail what I had taken as not needing further
argument and in his general view of the universe seems to me . . . to wobble
between sentiment and reason." About John Dewey's Experience and Nature:
"As badly written as possible. I could not have given an account of any
page or chapter and yet he seemed to me to have more of our cosmos in
his head than I ever found in a book before." His test of a great book is a
simple one: that it should "leave a scar on my mind."
He writes of law, defining it as "a-statement of the circumstances in which
the public force will Ie brought to bear upon men through the courts." Of
Justice: "I hate justice, which means that I know if a man begins to talk
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about that, for one reason or another he is shirking talking in legal terms."
This note of tough-mindedness recurs throughout the book, forming a sort
of counterpoint to the note of fiery idealism. The tough-minded note is
sounded especially when he is talking of political realities. He has scant
respect for talk about equality. "I hardly think of man as so sacred an
object as Laski seems to think him. I believe that Malthus was right in his
fundamental notion . . Every society is founded on the death of men.
In one way or another some are always and inevitably pushed down the
deadline." He hated also talk of neighborly love, and wrote it down as
humbug. He had "an imaginary society of jobbists, who' were free to be
egotists or altruists on the usual Saturday half holiday provided the" were
neither while on their job." Nor did he think much of "the human ultimate
that man is always an end in himself . . .We march up a conscript with
bayonets behind to die for a cause he doesn't believe in. And I feel no
scruples about it. Our morality seems to me only a check on the ultimate
domination of force, just as our politeness is a check on the impulse of every
pig to put his feet in the trough . . .. When it comes to the development
of a corpus juris the ultimate question. is what do the dominant forces of
the community want and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever
inhibitions may stand in the way." This was the ripe fruit of an idea he
had expressed over fifty years before, in 1873, in his comment on the gas-
stokers' strike. "This [Herbert Spencer's] tacit assumption of the solidarity
of the interests of society is very common, but seems to us false . . . In the
last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbor
. . .All that can be expected from modern improvements is that legisla-
tion should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accord-
ance with the will of the do facto supreme power in the community, and that
the spread of an educated sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of minorities
to a minimum . . . The more powerful interests must be more or less
reflected in legislation; which, like every other device of man or beast, must
tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest . . . It is no sufficient
condemnation of legislation that it favors one class at the expense of another;
for much or all legislation does that." Thus his view of politics and law is
seen as a curious compound of social Darwinism, the 'Marxian class-concept,
and a hard pragmatic seni-Austinian recognition of the realities of a social
system, all tempered by a tolerance of other people's views and a humorous
unwillingness to erect his own notions into absolutes.
But Holmes never tired of saying that he sav law and politics only as
parts of the cosmos. It is the cosmos with which his letters are most con-
cerned. His attitude toward it was always that of a gallant humility, and
a shrug of the shoulder that did not preclude the most arduous effort. "A
man must accept limits," he writes. And again "We begin with an act of
faith, with deciding that we are not God, for if we were dreaming the universe
we should be God so far as we knew." But within these limits that the
CosmoS imposes he believed in human heroism. "If . . . you bear the fire
in your belly, it will survive and transfigure the hard facts." He had learned
the "hard facts" on the battlefield in the Civil War. "The reality was to
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pass a night on the ground in the rain with your bowels out of order and
then after no particular breakfast to wade a stream and attack the enemy.
That is life." And it was this sense that he had of life which led him to
despise logic-chopping and theorizing, and to speak generally in an anti-
intellectualist vein. He called speculation in vacuo "churning the void to
make cheese." Thus also his feeling about absorption with the forms of
thought. "The only use of the forms is to present their contents, just as
the only use of a pint pot is to present the beer . . . and infinite meditation
upon the pot never will give you the beer." When he pushed his thought
back as far as it would go, he found finally "the mystery of the universe,"
admiration for the insight of the artist into that mystery, an emphasis on
will ("the capacity to want something fiercely and want it all the time, and
sticking to the rugged course")-and in the end, "faith in effort." "If I
were dying my last words would be: Have faith, and pursue the unknown
end".
This is Holmes in the last glorious decade of his life. He was no philoso-
pher in any close-knit technical sense. He was a literary psychologist, a
moralist who did not impose his moral code upon others, a liberal who makes
us redefine the term because there was nothing humanitarian in him, an
aphorist in the great tradition, a magician with words, a man who for one
could turn the stuff of his experience into wisdom, a legal craftsman who
always knew his tools were subordinate to his products, a human being almost
inhumanly capable of remaining unfooled by the shams of life and unde-
feated by its perplexities. He had his limitations, but this is no place to
discuss them at any length. I have written elsewhere2 that he was ridden
by two myths-that of the soldier and that of the gambler. Life was a cam-
paign, and one had to be a good soldier. Life was a throw of the dice, and
one had to take one's chances without grumbling, and abide by the rules of
the game. Out of such myths it was possible for a man who was the very
perfection and flowering of the New England aristocracy to fashion the rules
for a great and good life. But as one reads the letters and occasional papers
of his last decade, one is more than ever convinced that the greatness of
Holmes lies in his insights into the problem of the individual life, whatever
the society, and not into the problems of social construction or reconstruc-
tion. For all his pragmatism he has his eye on the universals and the identities
of life, not on its mutations and on the fierce conditionings it offers the
majority in any particular culture. It is fundamentally a gentleman's universe
in which Holmes lives, a universe of the elite. While we may question how
usable his system of thought will be for us in the turmoil on which we are
entering, we can only be grateful that American culture in its brief span
was able to fashion such a product.
MAX LERNERt
New York, N. Y.
2. (1936) 142 THE NATiON 746.
t Editor, The Nation.
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THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION. By Nelson P. Gaskill. New York:
Harpers, 1936. Pp. x, 175. $2.50.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDUSTRY. By Benjamin A. Javits. New York:
Harpers, 1936. Pp. xiv, 229. $3.00.
THE increasing concentration of economic authority, with accompanying
fundamental changes in the operation of the market, demands a reconsidera-
tion of the relations between government and industry. Messrs. Gaskill and
Javits approach this problem, the former as a member of the Federal Trade
Commission and the latter as a trade association counsel! The differences
in their experience and interest reveal themselves uncompromisingly in
their proposals.
Mr. Gaskill attributes the desire for state intervention in industry to a
"dynamic humanitarian impulse" springing from the conviction that the
common people have been wrongfully oppressed by large combinations of
capital which violated the doctrine of competition. This impulse has hitherto
been frustrated by the incapacity of Congress and the aggregation of power
in the hands of the Supreme Court. The Court's enunciation of the rule of
reason in the Standard Oil' decision was in fact a declaration of its annexa-
tion of power to make policy for the control of industry. The humanitarian
impulse, according to Mr. Gaskill, surged up again in a demand for the
clarification of the law. But Congress failed to replace the vague terms of
the Sherman Law with anything more specific and, therefore, left the real
power of control with the Court. The prohibitions of the Clayton Act were
stifled in the ambiguous words "restraint of trade" and "monopoly." In the
Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress sought to transfer powers to
regulate competition from the Court to the Federal Trade Commission.
Mr. Gaskill believes that the Court could easily have condemned the Act as
an unconstitutional delegation of powers. Although it did not choose to
deny the Commission existence in that way, it did refuse to surrender any
power and reduced the Commission to futilitv.
The National Recovery Administration, Mr. Gaskill believes, resuscitated
the humanitarian impulse and gave it a new vision and a new direction. But
again Congress avoided the task of laying down positive lines of social
policy, with the result that the Court remained paramount in the field. The
Federal Trade Commission, however, in obscure futility, developed the
notion of regulating competition in cooperation with industry and experi-
mented with it in trade practice conferences. The National Recovery Ad-
ministration built upon this precedent and experimented more broadly with
policies of regulating monopolistic competition, rather than compelling free
competition.
Mr. Gaskill's positive proposals, embodied in a proposed statute, develop
out of his interpretation of past relations between government and industry.
Congress must recapture its power to control interstate commerce by laying
down irl fair detail a social policy. This policy must express in positive
terms the requirements of free competition. The present absurdity of ad-
1. Standard Oil v. United States. 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
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ministering laws of "unfair" competition in deliberate disregard of the
effects of commercial practices upon consumers must be abandoned. Policy
should be stated and administered with regard to its broad economic conse-
quences. The basic objective should be "open markets and equal rights in
those inarkets as between all sellers and all buyers." This objective he
proposes to attain, on the one hand, by specific statutory prohibitions of
practices characteiised by fraud, deception, bad faith and misrepresentation.
In fact, the practices enumerated in his bill are, broadly speaking, regarded
as illegal at the present time. On the other hand, a new trade practice
conference procedure should be established with legal sanction. Rules ap-
proved by a new commission upon subjects enumerated in the act are to be
conclusively presumed to have been made in the public interest and de-
partures are to be regarded as unlawful. The subjects upon which rules
may be approved include standard marketing methods (where desirable to
prevent violations of the law), standard forms for price lists and contracts,
cost accounting including the comparison of details of cost accounts (pro-
viding that no common or average cost is agreed upon for use as a guide
to selling prices), the control of minimum prices and the prohibition of
sales below cost (subject to such exceptions as the industry may adopt),
open price quotation and selling (subject to uniform limitations imposed by
the commission upon waiting periods prior to the change of a filed price)
uniform discounts and terms of sale, uniform advertising and other allow-
ances, abolition or limitation of free deals, premiums, combination sales and
tying contracts, the classification of customers for trade discount purposes
and a number of functions already permitted to trade associations.
It is not in the least surprising that Mr. Gaskill should have been deeply
impressed, if not depressed, by the futility of the Federal Trade Commission
in particular and by the wider futility of anti-trust policy in general. It may
well be true that judicial control of business to the exclusion of any effective
control could be restricted by viore specific determination of policy by Con-
gress, although the Court would of course still have the ultimate power
to censor the decisions of the representative branch of the government. But
a more penetrating investigation of the influences affecting policy in the past
would have revealed difficulties in determining policy of which Mr. Gaskill
appears to be unaware.
The origin of the pressure for control of competitive conditions is not so
iulle as the conviction of oppression of the common man by aggregations
oi capital. \ dynamic capitalism reducing the costs of production destroys
, established positions in the market and, beyond a certain point, increases the
imperfections of the market as an instrument of competition. The small man
threatened by extinction demanded the maintenance of competition, and
(',nress. in pursuance of it, policy of compulsory competition, sought the
lower costs of large scale business without their consequences in terms of
dcrcasingly competitive markets. The drastic and immoral tactics adopted
bv those seeking larger positions in the market as a basis for successfully
exloiting their improved technique. were mistakenly regarded as the uhi-
mate causes of the -truggle. Since the interment of the National Industrial
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Recovery Act, this attitude has again appeared in the agitation by small
retailers, and the middlemen who serve them, for discriminatory taxation of
chain stores and for the Robinson-Patman Act. Tley are in direct historical
line with the early textile workers who destroyed machinery.
The belief that the small man can survive if the state checks immoral
behavior of the big one was doubtless also of some importance in encour-
aging efforts to secure group planning of trade practices under the trade
practice conference procedure of the Federal Trade Commission and under
the National Recovery Administration. But the urge for a change in the
attitude of the state to industry comes increasingly from 'the medium-sized
firm fearful of cutthroat competition, especially in times of depression. The
task which Mr. Gaskill asks Congress to perform is, therefore, that of
designing an environment for the marketing of manufactured products which
will give the advantages of the competitive market without competition. It
is very doubtful whether his ideal of an open market equally accessible to
all buyers and sellers can be attained in many industries without drastic
changes in the technique of production and the organization of industry.
It is, moreover, difficult to see how an open market, in any conventional
interpretation of the words, can be attained by a government agency standard-
izing discounts and allowances and assisting in the prohibition of sales below
the cost of production.
Apart from the doubtful relationship between M 1r. Gaskill's proposed
policy and a program of competition, there is serious doubt as to the desira-
bility of the changes he proposes. Most of these measures were the sub-
ject of extensive trial by the National Recovery Administration and of much
criticism in consequence--especially as to the prohibition of sales below
cost, minimum prices, and the standardization of discounts. In fact the diffi-
culties encountered by the administration in finding the devices that would
induce reasonable economy in the use of the means of production and a
satisfactory distribution of the produce of industry indicate the need for
searching re-examination of the reasons for the difficulties encountered h the
National Recovery Administration rather than for the writing of some its
least successful experiments into a new law to he administered by a new
commission.
Mr. Javits, from his vantage point, sets out in a political platform the
terms upon which the state might be separated from control over industry.
"Industry" should organize a National Economic Council out of the existing
trade associations, lalor bodies and technical groups. (The terms upon which
industry is to share power with labor and technical interests are not pre-
scribed.) This council is to guarantee provision for the entire employable
population at "fair" wages, setting aside a "'substantial" percentage of the
profits of industry for distribution among workers to ensure progressive
growth of purchasing power and the maintenance of the economy on a
prosperous and stable level. Member industries are to agree not to sell
below prices fair and profitable to both buyer and seller. The Council will
provide machinery by which "industry will guarantee the income of govern-
ment necessary to carry on government functions and in this way industry
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shall have 'taxation with representation'." The state will "no longer inter-
fere with the administration of industry," the courts being "a fine balance
wheel" between industry and government. The government will refrain
from manipulating the value of money without the accord of the repre-
sentatives of industry; "the credit of the government should be made avail-
able to industry." Industry should pledge itself, to supply credits for high-
ways, flood control and .similar projects. Every man, woman and child
"should have a known credit rating based upon his present and ultimate
value to economic society." The National Economic Council should nego-
tiate treaties with the economic interests of foreign nations. The plan will
"result eventually in the disappearance of the need for armaments." As soon
as possible women are to be excluded from manual and factory work because
they "have a higher and more important duty to perform for society."
Mr. Javits also believes that "fascism, nazism and communism are repug-
nant to the American interest in political liberty and private life I"
ARTHUR ROBERT BURNSf
New York, N. Y.
TAXABLE INCOME. By Roswell Magill.' New York: The Ronald Press,
1936. Pp. ix, 437. $5.00.
IN the first of a series of studies devoted to different aspects of the con-
cept of taxable income, Professor Magill undertakes to state the lawyer's
conception; the profession is happily represented. Pages of penetrating
analysis, which lay bare the crude inconsistencies of the decisions, are swiftly
followed by skillful synthesis from which there emerges a coherent philos-
ophy. In the final chapter Professor Magill modestly disclaims complete
success in defining the legal conception of taxable income. The disclaimer
is justified to the extent that it is impossible to formulate an air-tight defini-
tion of any complex legal conception. But as far as it is possible to define
the legal concept of taxable income, he has done so.
Professor Magill's major thesis is simply stated. Legislative and judicial
conceptions of taxable income deviate from those of the economist and the
accountant because legislatures and courts have had to shape their defini-
tions with reference to the practical exigencies of framing and administering
a concrete law. Mr. Magill proceeds to specify and examine these differences.
On the whole he also justifies them. Although occasionally there is a can-
didly critical passage, the general tone of the book manifests a sympathetic
understanding of the problems which have confronted judge and legislator
and the feeling that they have not been far off in their solutions.
The work is marshalled into three main divisions. Part one deals with
the most significant discrepancy between the legal and the economic con-
ceptions of income, the requirement of realization. The author discusses
$Assistant Professor of Economics, Columbia University.
1. Professor of Law, Columbia University.
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corporate distributions and the problems stemming from this source, from
Eisner v. Macomnber 2 to Koshland v. Helvering;3 income from sales, ex-
changes and purchases; and, the statutory modifications of judicial doctrines
of realization, or more specifically the tax free exchange and reorganization
provisions of the later federal income tax acts. A final chapter under this
heading is devoted to the problem of when income is realized as distinguished
from the question of whether income is realized.
Part two deals with the characteristics of income or the type of "benefits"
which the law regards as falling within that category. A preliminary chapter
on money and property is followed by a discussion of benefits through the
discharge of obligations and a chapter whose title is less self-explanatory
labelled "the element of control." Under this heading Professor Magill treats
the vexing problems of assigned income, income from community property,
and income from revocable trusts. Broadly, his contention in this connection
is that power to control the actual receipt of income affords a sound legal
basis for taxing the income to the person who has this power. With this
conception as a test, he undertakes with considerable success to explain and
reconcile the seemingly hopeless conflict which prevails in the assignment
cases. The author concludes part two with a chapter entitled "gross income,
gross receipts, or net income" which deals with the problem of the meaning
of income in the Sixteenth Amendment. Professor Magill espouses the
position that Congress has power to tax gross income, but not gross receipts,
with the possible exception of gross receipts from a mine from which no
deduction has been allowed on account of depletion.
In part three the author points out that the legal conception of income
is conditioned not only by the benefit which is received but by the source
from which it proceeds. Included are chapters on "compensatory payments"
and "gifts and bequests" and a final summing up modestly entitled "toward
a concept of taxable income."
It is difficult to find any flaws in Professor Magill's work. If there are
any of importance, they have escaped me. At one point, however, he seems
to have misstated a Supreme Court holding and at another le apparently
sanctions a broad conclusion of dubious soundness. General Utilities & Oper-
ating Co. v. Helvering4 is cited for this proposition: "It has heen held that
a corporation realizes no income by the distribution of a dividend in stock
of another corporation which has greatly appreciated in value; even though
the officers of the declaring corporation have previously found a purchaser
at a stated price; and the stockholders immediately after the distribution sell
the dividend stock at that price to the potential purchaser." This is a strained
interpretation of the case. The corporation did declare a dividend in an
amount equal to the appreciated value of the stock, which was payable in
the appreciated stock. The Court did hold that the distribution of the stock
to the stockholders of the declaring corporation did not constitute taxable
income to the corporation. But the Court did not pass upon the question of
2. 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
3. 298 U. S. 441 (1936).
4. 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
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whether or not it was proper to view the sale by the stockholders as a sale
by the corporation which resulted in taxable income to the corporation. The
Supreme Court reversed a holding by the circuit court of appeals to this
effect, but the reversal was solely upon the ground that the question was
not properly before the circuit court of appeals rather than upon the merits
of that point of view itself, as Professor Magill's statement seems to imply.
Likewise, he cites Jones v. United States5 for the proposition that "in
any event it is doubtful whether a saving is income," as a premise for the
probable conclusion that free tuition for a teacher's child at a school where
the 'professor was employed would not be income to the pedagogue. Those
who are acquainted with my domestic status will realize how completely I
am in sympathy with Professor Magill's aspirations in this direction. It
is difficult, however, to perceive any distinction between a "saving" and a
"benefit." The Jones case has always seemed to me to be a curious decision
which is more apt to be confined to its narrow facts than to furnish a starting
point for any broad doctrine that a saving is not income.
Although this is not entirely germane, attention should be called perhaps,
to the danger that the practising tax attorney may underestimate the value
and significance which this book has for him. The publisher says of it for
example, that "it is not in any sense a book on how to make up tax returns."
This is certainly not true unless some knowledge of what is and what is
not taxable income is unimportant in filling out a tax return. The careful
analysis of the cases; the thorough discussion of many of the most per-
plexing legal problems in connection with the federal income tax; the concise
and illuminating history of the various provisions of the federal income tax
legislation, which the author has so skillfully interwoven through the dis-
cussion of the decisions will appeal to the most pedestrian practitioner as
well as to abstract-minded academicians. This is a scholarly book, but it
is not barrenly academic. Professor Magill has a profound theoretical knowl-
edge of the federal tax system. But it is a knowledge bottomed upon a
solid substratum of practical experience. Taxable Income is an eminently
practical book because it has been written by a gifted scholar who spins
a theory as facilely as he states a case; because the author is endowed with
a happy prescience which enables him to see not only cases and statutes
but the fine lines of logic and the bolder strands of policy, which clarify
the past and illumine the future.
CHARLES L. B. LoWNDESt
Durham, N. C.
5. 60 Ct. CI. 552 (1925).
tProfessor of Law, Duke University.
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